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Introduction
In recent years, more specifically the past twenty years, the right wing in Italy has taken a
hard line approach that is largely against immigrants coming to Italy. At the governmental level,
there are many issues between the various parties as to how the immigration influx should be
dealt with. Though there is a program set in place to save refugee boats stranded at sea, in
practice, it has proven to be extremely difficult and has faced a good deal of criticism from
political parties across the aisle. In fact, starting in 2016, the Italian government has been
illegally sending back migrant children.1 On the societal level, fear mongering has turned native
Italians against the idea of immigration. Even in the more liberal parts of Italy, such as Bologna,
there have been cases of people physically blocking the transportation of refugees in order to
keep them from settling in Italy.2 Many Italians complain that these immigrants cause strain on
the stagnant Italian economy or that Muslim immigrants will take away the strong Catholicism
that has been the major religion and culture of Italy for hundreds of years.
There are multiple reasons Italians have reacted so negatively to the arrival of these
immigrants: worries that these immigrants are taking jobs away from hard-working Italians, that
Italy has been homogeneous in race and religion for so long that it is difficult to adjust the
picture of what it means to be Italian, scapegoating and so on.
Throughout this thesis, I will be looking into where this xenophobia has come from and
how we can explain it in today’s context. After all, other countries in Europe, such as Germany,
have opened their borders to refugees and immigrants coming to their country. What I will be

Giulia Saudelli, “L’Italia sta respingendo illegalmente i minori migranti che arrivano da soli,” Vice News, August
2, 2016, https://news.vice.com/it/article/minori-stranieri-soli-respingimenti.
2
“In Emilia-Romagna hanno alzato le barricate per impedire l’ingresso ai profugi,” Vice News, October 25, 2016,
https://news.vice.com/it/article/gorino-barricate-profughi-ferrara
1
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focusing on is why Italy has had such a negative reaction to these immigrants in a way that has
not yet been addressed. The main question I will be answering throughout this project is how we
explain the rise of the xenophobia in response to the influx of immigrants in Italy today.
Though most people would not care to admit this, there are tensions surrounding a
racially changing population of Italy. Though Southern Italy has experienced slightly more racial
diversity due to its proximity to Northern Africa, Italy has remained rather homogenous in its
recent history. These recent racial changes have been especially visible in Northern Italy where
the lack of diversity in the past is even more evident. Though this thesis will not be focusing on
the colonial aspects of the Fascist government, it is worth noting that during his time, in the
1930s, Mussolini colonized certain countries in Africa (mainly Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia).
During this time of colonization, Italians were united as a homogenous population due to a
newfound sense of nationalism.3 Though these countries were colonized, there is today a
relatively low population of immigrants from these formerly colonized countries in Italy. The
idea of Italy becoming a multi-racial and a multiethnic country has caused great discomfort
among Italians who have only ever known Italy to be a white, Catholic nation.
With the changing face of what an Italian looks like, Italy has recently seen the rise of the
alt-right along with the rest of Europe and America. This fear of immigration has seen a spike in
the popularity of the Lega Nord which was originally founded in 1991 as a Northern secessionist
movement and which is currently lead by Matteo Salvini. Though the original goal of this
movement was to have the North succeed from the South due to the North being the more
industrialized, richer part of the country, it has now transformed into an almost nationalist party
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Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, eds. Italian Colonialism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 22.
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aimed at keeping immigrants from entering the country. Though the party refuses the xenophobic
label with which it is often associated, it exudes a sense of victimhood, claiming that the
Northern League is unfairly characterized as a racist, xenophobic party.4
As I already briefly mentioned, there are several possible ways to explain this xenophobic
response to immigrants. The most common arguments made by the Italian public are mainly
concerned with economic, religious and racial reasons. Due to the fact that the Italian economy
has been stagnant for so long and there is a high unemployment rate in Italy (currently 12.4%, or
4 points higher than the European average), many Italians are scapegoating the immigrants
claiming that they are taking jobs from national Italians. There is also a fear that, due to the
majority of immigrants being of the Muslim faith, the longstanding tradition of Italy’s
Catholicism is at risk. Since Italy has been such a deeply religious and largely homogenous
population for so long, this idea of the “religion of Italy” becoming Islam is a very real fear for
many Italians. However, my hypothesis as to why Italy has had its extreme response is more
rooted in the past than the present. In the wake of Fascism in Italy, there was a general desire to
immediately forget what had happened.
Though there have been articles published about the issue of immigration in Italy, they
for the most part address who these immigrants are rather than the response to immigration.
There has also been a large debate over where these immigrants are settled within Italy which
has caused tensions to rise between the North and the South5, which already is a contentious
relationship. The main arguments I have heard as to why Italy has been so unwelcoming have
mainly come from the news or what is talked about among citizens. As stated before, a lot of the
Guido Passalacqua, “Bossi si infuria: siete voi i razzisti,” La Repubblica, November 22, 2000,
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2000/11/22/bossi-si-infuria-siete-voi-razzisti.html.
5
Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988 (Penguin Books, 1990).
4
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reasons are generally related to the economy and religion. However, the one argument that many
Italians would refuse to say outloud is the issue of race. For the most part, Italy has been
homogenous, not just religiously, but also racially and ethnically. Up until recently, there were
very few black people who lived in Italy, and even black people who are Italians in every sense
of the word are still not considered Italian due to the color of their skin.
Very few scholars have taken on the idea that the historical amnesia that surrounds
Fascism in Italy has contributed to this rejection of immigration. In addition, up until recently,
Italy was a nation of emigrants, not immigrants. The idea of immigration is very new to Italy as
it was far more common for people to leave Italy than to come to Italy. For many people, this
new idea of immigration coupled with the economic and cultural struggles that Italy faces today,
is enough of a reason as to why Italy has been xenophobic. The lack of accountability of Italy’s
actions during Fascism has lead to this rejection of accepting refugees into Italy.
Obviously a combination of factors influence how Italians treat immigrants. However,
there has been very little research done on the historical amnesia that Italy has about Fascism
even though I believe there is merit to the argument. To begin to think about the issue of
integration, I have taken a couple of cases of integration in Italian society. In Italy, Jews have
spent hundreds of years slowly becoming accepted into Italian society. Another, less known
issue of integration in Italy is the divide between the North and South. Though this issue is far
from resolved, there have been attempts at finding ways to make Italy a more cohesive nation.
Perhaps if we look at these cases of integration, they may help understand the issue of immigrant
integration and acceptance today.

5

In fictitious or autobiographical accounts of World War II, there is a focus on the division
of Italy, and the attempts of integration into Italian society. Before Italy was even united as a
county, anti-Semitism was rampant in the city states. The first ghetto was established in 1516 in
Venice, Italy.6 Ever since then, Italian Jews have fought not just for integration, but also for
recognition. Even after Jews were emancipated in 1861, they were still not viewed as equal to the
Catholic Italian. Many Italian Jews were slowly integrated into society mainly due to the reform
movement which made worship more private than ever before.7 As Italian Jews became more
integrated into Italian culture, they were further distanced from Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews
and their cultures. We see this distance in Primo Levi’s account of his time in Auschwitz in his
book Se questo è un uomo. Once he arrived to Auschwitz, it became clear that as a Jew who
didn’t speak Yiddish, he was largely isolated from the general population.8 In fact, Levi had not
been particularly religious before or after his time at the camp, thus showing that he was an
integrated Italian.
There is also the issue of integration within Italy itself between the North and the South.
During the Fascist period, this rift was quite noticeable. With Fascism being prevalent in the
North of Italy, the South remained in the grips of Mafia control. In fact, during his reign,
Mussolini tried to end the Mafia rule in the South but failed due to its strong hold over the local
government.9 This divide was further shown in Carlo Levi’s book, Cristo si è fermato a Eboli, in
which he recounts his experience as a northerner who was exiled in southern Italy during
Fascism. In this book, he discusses the extreme poverty and lack of resources southern Italians

Anna Foa, Ebrei in Europa: dalla peste nera all'emancipazione (Bari: Laterza, 1990).
Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, “La riforma ebraica e le sue articolazione fra Otto e Novecento,” in Le religioni e il
mondo moderno (Torino: Einaudi, 2008), 125-144.
8
Primo Levi, Se questo è un uomo (Einaudi, 1947).
9
Ginsborg, History of Contemporary Italy, 34-35.
6
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had to endure at the time. Many in the town were illiterate and had no way of escaping poverty.10
Though poverty still persists in southern Italy today, there have been many efforts of creating a
more equal Italy, with the italian government investing heavily in the south after WWII with
little to show for it. One issue that has been addressed in many articles is the fact that many of
today’s immigrants coming to Italy today are entering through southern Italy, mainly Sicily and
Calabria. This has placed an added burden on an already burdened South, but there is little that
has been to reconcile this disparity.11 The gap between southern Italy and northern has been an
issue since the unification of Italy and still persists today.
There have been articles published speaking to the idea of collective amnesia surrounding
the Fascist period in Italy. These articles speak about how this national amnesia is portrayed in
the media12: The narrative they suggest is that the holding camps were an “oasis” for prisoners of
war and Italian Jews,13 and that those who were originally Fascists denounced it once Fascism
fell in Italy.14 Though these articles address the issue of national amnesia within Italy and the
willingness to forget the very active role it played in the atrocities of the war, they indicate no
connection to how this amnesia affects Italy today. Throughout this thesis, my hope is to provide
such a missing link between the amnesia of Italy’s Fascism during World War II and the
xenophobic response Italy has to immigrants today.

Carlo Levi, Cristo si è fermato a Eboli (Einaudi, 1963).
Alessandra Corrado, “Clandestini in the Orange Towns: Migrations and Racisms in Calabria’s Agriculture,”
Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 4, no. 2 (2011).
12
Susanne C. Knittel, “A Severed Branch: The Memory of Fascism on Stage and Screen,” in The Historical
Uncanny: Disability, Ethnicity, and the Politics of Holocaust Memory (Fordham University, 2015).
13
James Walston, “History and Memory of the Italian Concentration Camps,” The Historical Journal 40, no. 1
(1997).
14
Rosario Florenza, “Sacrificial Memory and Political Legitimacy in Postwar Italy: Reliving and Remembering
World War II,” History and Memory 24, no. 2 (2012).
10
11
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In contemporary Italy today, there is a lack of discussion about Fascism in the general
public. It has been very difficult to find articles or books not on what happened during the Fascist
period in Italy, but there has been little to no link as to how that time period has an impact on
today’s world. Throughout this exploration, I hope to better link the forgotten past of Fascism in
Italy and how it has influenced present day politics. This lack of recognition is deeply troubling,
and by the end of this project, I hope to have bridged a type of gap that has existed in the
literature surrounding both Fascism in Italy and present day xenophobia.
Throughout this thesis, I hope to show the how nation amnesia has manifested itself both
in the rhetoric of self-victimization and the odd relationship both Fascism and the Lega have
with the Church and Catholicism in general. By drawing out these similarities between Fascism
and the Lega Nord, I will show that these commonalities are more than just mere coincidences,
they mirror each other in action and rhetoric.
My argument is that since Italy has tried to forget the role it played in World War II and
the wide spread shame of Fascism, this lack of accountability has caused Italy to have a more
xenophobic response to immigration. Since there is a strong sentiment of self-victimization
within Italy, their active forgetfulness of Fascism has caused their mentality to shift away from
reparations to playing the victim once again. This contrasts with the case of Germany, when its
constant remembrance of Nazism and the extreme shame that is felt about Germany’s actions
during the war has caused present day Germany to take a much more welcoming approach to
immigrants coming to Europe. However, since Italy had a very different ending to its war and
how it is generally remembered, it has had a much more negative response to these immigrants.
Since Mussolini fell before the end of the war and with the arrival of the Allies in southern Italy,

8

by the end of the war, Italy was on the side of the allies. During this tumultuous time, Italy was
also in a civil war fought by the partisans (anti-Fascists) and the Fascists. This back and forth just
further shows the complicated climate of Italy at the time.
This language of self-victimization can also be found in the Lega’s political platform.
The Lega was founded on the idea that northern Italy was overcompensating for the agrarian
South. To them, southern Italy was draining the industrialized North of its rich economic
advancements. Thus, the party was founded on this idea of self-victimization. More recently
however, the platform of the party has changed and is now more focused on closing Italy’s
borders. The Lega’s main argument against these immigrants is that they are depleting the
resources of an already struggling Italy. Though their focus has shifted away from their
secessionist past, the language of self-victimization still persists. This common language is the
missing link that has not yet been addressed in Italy. This self-victimization link explicitly
connects the historical amnesia of Fascism to the anti-immigrant response in Italy today.15
Along with the language of self-victimization, both the Lega and Fascism have a complex
relationship with the Catholic Church. During his life, Mussolini never considered himself to be
a religious man.16 Even though he was not religious and never had much of an interest in the
Church, this began to change when Pope Pius XI realized he could have a beneficial relationship
with Mussolini and Fascism. Once Pius XI was the head of the Vatican, he began a symbiotic
relationship with Mussolini. Since Italy is a deeply Catholic nation, Mussolini would benefit
from a positive relationship with the Church. In exchange, the Church would effectively turn a
blind eye to the atrocities committed under Fascist rule in order to try and stay neutral fearing
Stefano Tomelleri, “Toward a Sociology of Ressentiment” in Ressentiment (Michigan State University Press,
2015).
16
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: a Biography (Vintage Books, 1983).
15
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that condemnation would further agitate and cause more harm to those affected under Fascist
rule.17 With this relationship, Fascism grew stronger by promoting this relationship with the
Church.
Concerning the Lega, there is also a complicated relationship between the Church and the
past and current leaders of the Lega. The founder of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, has always
considered himself a secular Italian though he does participate in the Church at the baseline level
such as having his kids baptized and occasionally attending church services. While Bossi was the
leader of the Lega, he did not have much of a relationship with the Church due to the fact that the
Pope was conservative and did not care to comment on the actions of the Lega. However, in
recent years this relationship has changed due to the fact that there is now a new leader of the
Lega and a new Pope. Matteo Salvini, the current leader of the Lega, has commented on religion
in Italy often using Islamophobia to argue against immigration. In addition, he has had some
public clashes with Pope Francis due to the Pope’s pro-refugee stance. Just last year, Salvini
took to Twitter to publicly denounce the Pope’s call for assisting refugees. In his tweet, Salvini
stated that the Pope supported an “unprecedented invasion” of immigrants coming to Italy for
refuge.18 Before this outburst against the Church for its pro-immigration stance, Salvini gave
some leeway to accepting immigrants into Italy. However, he was still focused on religion
claiming that, “If we really must welcome immigrants, let them be Christians. While waiting to

Frank J. Coppa, “The Papal Response to Nazi and Fascist Anti-Semitism: From Pius XI to Pius XII” in Jews in
Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule 1922-1945 (Cambridge, 2005).
18
Luca Romano, “Salvini contro il Papa: ‘Favorisce l’invasione,’” Il Giornale, April 16, 2016,
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/mondo/salvini-contro-papa-favorisce-linvasione-1247495.html. “Un’invasione senza
precedenti.”
17
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block this organized invasion.”19 Though the Lega is not a religiously affiliated group, they toe a
careful line with the Church due to the deep Catholicism within the country.
There is also a sense, both in Italy and abroad, that Mussolini was a puppet of Hitler who
followed along with his ideologies and laws, due to Mussolini’s implementation of Hitler’s racial
laws, even though this is not the case.20 The idea that Italy was less proactive in coming up with
these racial laws and this sense of nationality is wrong and pushes much of the blame away from
Mussolini and the Fascists. Italy’s willingness to downplay its involvement and forget the very
active role it had during the war has contributed to Italy to have a very anti-immigrant response.
Since there is no palpable sense of culpability within society for Italy’s role during World War
II, many in the population are turning away from refugees in a way that is very different to the
response in Germany. Since Italy has largely taken the role of being a victim of Nazi Germany,
rather than an offender, during World War II, there is no sense of needing to welcome those it
once turned away. However, Germany has made it very clear that it is open and happy to accept
refugees. This acceptance is largely tied to its sense of national shame and memorialization of its
history during Nazism. My hypothesis is that Italy’s lack of accepting responsibility for its role
during the war has contributed to the hands off, anti-immigrant approach it has taken when it
comes to accepting refugees into the country.
Throughout this thesis, I will show that due to the failure to right past wrongs, Italy is in a
cycle that is bound to repeat itself. Through the rhetoric and language used by both Mussolini

Raffaello Binelli, “Immigrazione, l’ultima idea di Salvini: ‘Usiamo le piattaforme dell’Eni in disuso,’” Il
Giornale, August 21, 2015,
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/immigrazione-lultima-idea-salvini-usiamo-piattaforme-delleni-1162150.html.
“Se proprio dobbiamo accogliere immigrati, che siano di religione cristiana. In attesa di bloccare questa invasione
organizzata.”
20
F.W. Deakin, The Six Hundred Days of Mussolini (Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966).
19
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and the leaders of the Lega, I will show that there is a similar vein of self-victimization and
blaming the world around them for their shortcomings as leaders. In addition, this language is
used as a way to unite groups of people under the impression of imminent danger or under the
impression of being in a subservient position. The lack of accountability Italy faced post World
War II for its war crimes further allowed this amnesia to take root within the culture of Italy.
Thus far, there has been a gap in the literature concerning the memories of the past, or
lack thereof, and the connection to the political climate today. As I mentioned before, much of
the literature about immigration in Italy today primarily focuses on the sheer number of
immigrants and where they come from. These articles also ponder why there has been a rise in
anti-immigration sentiment across Italy, however the reasons listed are ones that do not address
the particulars of Italy’s reaction and response but rather more generalized, superficial reasons.
What I hope to achieve is to open up a new line of discourse that is lacking in the literature in
order to begin exploring other ways of explaining Italy’s xenophobic response. I believe that by
addressing the active amnesia many Italians have over the actions of Fascism during WWII, it
will be easier to understand and respond to why Italy has had such an anti-immigrant response
and may bring to light other issues clouded by this amnesia.
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Chapter 1

Fascism and Self Victimization
“Fascism is considered a period of dictatorship to erase.”21 -My nonna, Catterina Marchetti
The rise of Mussolini in Italy was largely focused on the idea of Italy restoring its former
glory as a Roman state. This idea further propelled support for Mussolini when he called for the
“reclamation” of former Roman colonies to recreate a scaled-down version of what once was the
Roman Empire. Though the League of Nations now forbade colonization, Mussolini began using
a rhetoric of self victimization in order to drum up support for colonizing Africa. His use of this
type of rhetoric proved to be quite successful at deflecting any kind of culpability as well as at
uniting the population in favor of colonization. This language continued beyond this particular
instance, however this time, it was not just Mussolini who employed self victimization but the
entire population. When Italy was forced to give up its colonies after the war ended, a similar
political rhetoric was used not only by Mussolini when he justified Italy’s need for colonies, but
also by the Italian population which argued that it was unfair that Italy was the only nation to
lose its colonies. Meanwhile, they were not being further punished for the crimes that Fascism
had committed during the war.
Beyond colonialism, the language of self victimization was used by the Italian population
after the fall of Mussolini as a way to deflect any accountability for the crimes Fascism had
committed. Towards the end of the war, Mussolini began what would become his habitual
diatribe of pushing the blame onto others. Since he had already fallen from power, he began this
trend by blaming Hitler and the Germans for his political demise. It was not until Mussolini had

“Comunque il fascismo è considerato un periodo di dittatura da cancellare.” All translations are my own unless
otherwise noted.
21
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joined Germany in the war that Italy began to start losing power according to Mussolini. This
language was also used by the general population which was slightly more credible since
Germany invaded northern Italy after Mussolini fell. This is not to say that the Germans are to
blame; Italy was the first nation to elect a totalitarian dictator to power before Germany followed
suit some years later. This discourse continued after the war with Italy from blaming Mussolini
to blaming Yugoslavia, which was largely a victim of Italian aggression, to blaming the Nazis.
Fascist Italy was never truly held accountable for crimes committed during the war thus
perpetuating an air of self victimization. After the war, the Allies largely let Italy go unpunished
mainly due to the very real possibility of Italy becoming a Communist country after the war.
Since this was the time of the Red Scare, the Allies, especially America, were determined to
keep Italy in front of the Red Curtain. By not turning Communist, Italy was able to dodge the
prosecution and trials that Germany faced after the war. Since they were not held accountable for
the war crimes committed, this further allowed Italy to be insinuate the language of self
victimization within the population. Because of this, Italy remained virtually absolved of any
crime it had committed during the war, thus reinforcing the myth of the “good Italian.”
During the rise of Mussolini’s Fascist Italy, it became apparent that there was one major
aspect that set Italy apart from the rest of Europe: its lack of colonies. Mussolini desired to
restore Italy to its original Roman roots and reestablish its empire.22 However, by the time
Mussolini had decided to recreate this idea of an Italian empire, the League of Nations had
already written a clause preventing more colonization. Undeterred by the this deliberation,
Mussolini continued to pursue the dream of having Italian colonies in Africa along with the rest

Nicola Labanca, “Il fascismo e le colonie,” in Oltremare. Storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana (Il Mulino,
2007) 155.
22
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of Western Europe.23 Mussolini was able to use this argument of Italy not being allowed to have
colonies to his advantage. By painting the League of Nations in an adversarial light, he was able
to rally national support for Italy invading Ethiopia. He claimed that the League of Nations was
punishing Italy unfairly by invoking this rule since many other European countries already had
colonies.24 Luckily for Mussolini, the majority of the Italian population rallied behind him, and
with public support, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935.
The particular covenant that was invoked by the League of Nations is one that recognizes
invasion of another country as an act of war and that aims to punish the invading nation through
trade restrictions. Mussolini admitted that he was breaking this covenant, but found it to be
unfair. He claimed that the League of Nations was attempting to humiliate Italy by stating that
Ethiopia was equal to Italy. Italy claimed that it was trying to civilize the uncivilized peoples of
Ethiopia, a statement that was readily accepted by the excited Italian public. Although Mussolini
was able to put a positive spin on the act of colonization, in reality he was only able to do so by
using the language of self victimization when referring to Italy’s right to colonize. The kind of
language he used is quite hypocritical since Italy was in the position of power in this situation.
Since he used self victimization to justify his reason for colonizing, he denied the African
communities any sense of legitimacy to their suffering. This language which is used to portray
Italy as a victim when it indeed was acting as the aggressor is just an instance of the nationalistic
narrative used during the Fascist time period.
Fast forwarding to the end of Mussolini’s regime and the tortured ending of World War
II, the language of self victimization was still in use. Though there are many example of this
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rhetoric used post WWII in an attempt to absolve Italy of any wrongdoing, this section will focus
on how this language was used in reference to colonization. After the war, Italy was forced to
give up its colonies as part of its punishment for the war crimes committed in the name of
Fascism. Though this punishment barely begins to compensate for all the acts committed by Italy
during WWII, a segment of the Italian population still considered themselves as being the
victims on this issue. In 1947, the Paris Peace Treaty forced Italy to turn over all the territories it
had conquered during the war despite their hope that they would be able to keep them. Although
Italy was forced to give up these colonies, they were able to avoid any other punishment
regarding what they had done to the colonies during the war.25 The fact that other European
countries were able to keep their colonies while Italy was forced to give them up only served to
substantiate self victimization. This view that Italy was being unfairly punished by being forced
to give up its colonies was blown out of proportion due to the fact that other than giving up its
colonies, Italy did not face the same kind of punishment as the other Axis powers post WWII.
By avoiding the kind of high-profile trials that marked the post-WWII reckoning in
Germany and Japan, the Allies allowed Italy to go largely unpunished for their war crimes and
later continue the narrative of self victimization. In this way, the Allies exempted Italians from
feeling any sense of guilt for the horrendous acts committed during Fascism. Such acts were
committed both on Italian soil (where a civil war ensued), and abroad. With no sense of guilt or
wrongdoing, Italy was able to continue this trend of not acknowledging their own actions during
the war. This lack of discourse only furthered the amnesia of Italy’s true actions. There has been
an overwhelming lack of public acknowledgement about Italy’s colonial past as well as the
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“absence of a collective consciousness of the country’s African colonies.”26 With this amnesia,
the victims of Italy’s colonization are not remembered and their stories are not heard beyond the
border of their country.27 In fact, Ethiopia made an attempt to have Italy pay for the war crimes it
had committed during WWII, but it was blocked by Britain in order to preserve British interests
and its ability to influence Italy. Since Britain was a powerful force within Europe, it wanted to
maintain control over the Western European block. At this time, there was also the threat that
Italy could become a Communist power after the fall of Mussolini. For these reasons, Britain
wanted to prevent any possibility of Italy destabilizing and turning to Communism under the
threat that Communism would overtake Western Europe starting with Italy.28 This silencing of
the grievances from Italy’s former colonies further reinforced the idea of Italy remaining
blameless for its own actions during the war.
The lack of accountability Italy faced beyond simply for its colonial crimes, was largely
due to the Red Scare. The idea that Italy might turn into a Communist state, which was a very
real possibility, is what caused the Allies to back off from punishing Italy so that they would stay
in front of the Iron Curtain. This is one of the reasons Britain refused to punish Italian war
criminals for crimes committed in Ethiopia during WWII.29 Britain largely thought that by
prosecuting Italian war criminals, this process would only further destabilize a precarious Italy.
Though Britain was pressured to prosecute these criminals, they were able to successfully hold
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off doing so.30 However, Britain was not alone in trying to prevent Italy from becoming a
communist nation. The U.S. was also very involved in trying to prevent the inevitability of Italy
falling behind the Soviet curtain. The main motivation for the U.S. was to show to the rest of the
world that it was able to control the Soviet Union from further spreading its communism.31 While
Britain refused to punish Italy for its war crimes, America got involved in the Italian elections
and ironically, both governments shared the same goal: to use any means necessary to prevent
Italy from becoming a Communist stronghold.
The Soviet campaign to turn Italy into a communist nation largely divided the Italian
population. Although there was significant support from certain groups of the Italian population,
there were also former Fascists who were very wary of a communist government. Memories of
World War I and acts committed by the Russians against Italians further played into the idea the
Italy was the victim of Russian aggression.32 Although many Italians shared memories of being
victimized at the hands of the Russians during WWI, many Italians were still pushing for a
communist government, and the Allied countries were trying desperately to prevent such a turn
of events. Since the fall of Fascism, many Italians wanted to return to Italy’s Socialist roots
which were emerging post-WWI before Fascism took control of the government. Though the
Allies wanted to stop this transformation, there were many factors to be considered. One major
issue was that by prosecuting Italian war criminals, the relationship the Brits had with the Italians
could be jeopardized and more importantly, further strengthen the PCI (the Italian Communist
Party).33 The pressure that Britain faced from both sides of this debate lead to a strain on their
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relationship with the emerging Italian government. Once this strain reached an all time high in
early 1946, the U.S. intervened, and after much consideration by the State Department, the U.S.
decided to stall and “not implement any policy decision” relating to Italy so as not to further
destabilize it.34
After the end of the war, in 1946, the Allies came to a compromise that would neither
thoroughly punish Italy nor completely absolve them of guilt. However, this idea failed in
practice in large measure due to Italy stubbornly refusing to accept any form of responsibility or
indeed, blame for what they had done. This was caused and exacerbated by a few different
actions. First, Italy was not mentioned in the “Moscow Declaration of Atrocities.” This
document only cited the German war criminals with no reference to Italian war criminals
whatsoever. In addition to this, Italy stated that most Fascists who had entered Italy into the war
in 1940 had either been killed by partisans or would be tried by the Italian courts. This attempt to
deal with post-war reckoning internally further strengthened the official position that Italy was
not just an aggressor, but also a victim of war crimes itself.35 Italy also made it clear that they
would not cooperate in any extradition process of war criminals. This prevented them from
sending such criminals back to the country where war crimes were committed which, during this
period, was typically Yugoslavia. Since the Allies were hesitant to hold Italy accountable due to
its instability, the Allies further distanced themselves from the calls from the Slavic government
to punish Italy for its war crimes when Yugoslavia shot down two U.S. planes in 1946 which
caused the Allies to treat Yugoslavia as a pariah state.36 These different factors all played into the
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tacit agreement that the Allies were not to going to make Italy pay for the war crimes committed
in order to keep the country as stable as possible.
This overly generous act of forgiveness was not only present in the actions of the Allies,
but was also evident within Italy itself. After Mussolini fell from power, many of the partisans
were able to come out of the shadows and carry out personal vendettas against former Fascists.
Though these killings were not celebrated as one may be lead to imagine, they were seen as
something that had to be done in order to move on.37 Many of these vendettas were in fact
carried out, but they proved to be unsuccessful in expunging every single Fascist who was
involved in the war effort. Italy had previously claimed that they would try war criminals in an
Italian court of law yet history shows that this never happened. In June 1946, the Communist
Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, acting as provisional justice minister, granted general amnesty
for crimes committed by the Fascist regime in order to integrate the former fascists into a newly
democratic Italy. This act was meant not to forgive the crimes but rather to forgive those who
perpetrated them. Yet this lack of accountability only reinforced the idea that the Fascists had
done nothing wrong and should not pay for what they had done.38 This act of pardoning only
added to the increasing amnesia that followed Fascism and has remained to this day.
There was also a sense by many Italian partisans who survived German concentration
camps that one must forget in order to move on. This notion was made most famous by the
Italian Jewish author and concentration camp survivor, Primo Levi. Levi insisted that those who
could not forget would be “tormented by nightmares,” but that those who could “dismiss
everything … have begun to live.” Though Levi was not suggesting forgetting what happened,
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he was focused on putting the “past aside and transcend[ing] it.”39 Despite Italy not calling for a
complete blackout of its wrongdoing, its willingness to put the past behind them without analysis
or open acceptance furthered the concept of historical amnesia in that Italy could be seen not as
the aggressor but rather the victim of the war.
Italy’s Fascist amnesia was also exacerbated by the act of forgetting about and neglecting
to memorialize Italian war camps. These camps were not only in Italy but also in Yugoslavia and
Croatia which were under Italian rule during the time of the war. These camps were not
necessarily all concentration camps; some were camps to hold people made prisoner for myriad
reasons. Most of the time, they were used to hold prisoners of war, usually Croats or Slavs who
were fighting against the Italians colonizing their land. However, Italy also housed Jews and
Italian partisans who had been captured.40 Most of these camps were ignored after the war ended
because there were many other more “important” atrocities to focus on. In addition, many of the
prisoners were foreigners who had no ties to where they were kept, and many of those who
created and ran the camps were still in power and were more than happy to let that memory fade.
41

These camps were not set up the same way German concentration camps were yet similarly the

prisoners were still heavily reliant on the guards to give them food and water. Because of this,
there were deaths at the camps, sometimes at rates similar to German concentrations camps.
However, since there was the idea that Italy had ended the war siding with the victor, no one was
held accountable for the deaths of those who died while they were detained.42 There was a lack
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of guilt in the Italian population for those who suffered in the camps due to the fact that the
prisoners’ own actions is what got them arrested in the first place.43
In addition to all of this, there was no accountability whatsoever on the judicial front for
these actions until the 1990s when information came to light that had been deliberately
covered-up by the Italians, in what is now called the “archive of shame.”44 Lastly, in what could
be described as a self-serving argument designed to exculpate their own actions, the Jews who
had been held at these camps were told that they had been saved from the German concentration
camps that were much more brutal than Italy’s. In this way, the Italians were able to portray
themselves as helping the Jews, saving them from a much worse situation.45 Adding to the
twisted perception, most of the time, the Jews were treated better than the others in the camp,
allowing the Italians to make the argument that they were saving the Jews from a horrible fate.46
These camps have largely been forgotten both in and outside of Italy, and the memories that do
remain tend to twist reality to portray the Italians in a positive light.
After the war, Italians scapegoated as many different groups as possible in order to
deflect any sense of blame by the Italian government and people. The first and most obvious
target of this deflection involved blaming the Germans for the unspeakable massacres they had
committed during the war. Even prior to the end of the war Mussolini had already begun this
trend. He claimed that had he not joined forces with Hitler in 1940, Fascism may have been able
to be successful in much the same vain as Franco’s regime in Spain. After his fall from power in
1943, Mussolini blamed Hitler for the fall of Fascism. While he did admit that he was the one to
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join Hitler in 1940, he blamed everyone around him, including Hitler, for Italy’s loss. He
claimed that he only chose to join Hitler due to pressure from the Germans to join their cause. He
blamed German generals, asserting that they did not strategize well and did not listen to him and
his strategies. According to him, the Germans didn’t understand politics, and if they had let
Mussolini lead the Axis powers they would have won the war.47 Mussolini was not the only one
who felt this way about Germany. It was almost a universal belief that Germany was the main
aggressor towards Italy during and after the war.
After the war ended, there was a common belief that the Germans were at fault for much
of the pain inflicted upon the Italians. Immediately after the war, the state had decided to give
assistance to those who were affected by German aggression in Italy. Hence, Italy was able to
shift the focus from its own wrongdoings to the wrongdoings of the Germans. For example,
families of loved ones who had been killed by Germans when they invaded Italy were rewarded
with 20,000 lire (a significant compensation in those days) to support them after their loved one
had died.48 In this way, the deaths of Italians who had died while fighting the war were not only
memorialized, they were also politicized. They had become people who died fighting for their
country no matter the real motivation. The state very publically and purposefully spoke about its
citizens who had suffered through the war in order to further reinforce this idea of a “victim
identity.”49 Further contributing to this idea of Italy being a victim of Nazi aggression was the
fact that Italy was the country that suffered the most civilian massacres on its own territory in
Western Europe. From this perspective Italy was not portrayed as an accomplice of Hitler but

Smith, Mussolini, 314-315.
Victoria C. Belco, “Restitution, Reparations, and Rewards” in War, Massacre and Recovery in Central Italy,
1943-1948 (University of Toronto Press, 2010) 166.
49
Belco, “Restitution, Reparations, and Rewards,” 171.
47
48

23

was instead seen as a victim of his aggression.50 Thus, the myth of the “evil German” and the
“good Italian” was born perpetuating the myth that Italy was the victim of an aggressive force
and never a perpetrator.
Though much of the blame was placed on Nazi Germany for the atrocities committed
during the war, the partisans in Italy were blamed for provoking the attacks carried out by the
Germans. Partisans were civilians who joined the fight against Fascism and Nazi Germany once
the Germans invaded northern Italy. Since partisans were part of the local community, yet often
lived on the fringes of the community, they became secondary scapegoats for the atrocities
committed by the Nazis and Fascists during the war.51 Partisans were not only seen as provoking
the Nazis to commit massacres, but also as having failed to protect the victims or even offer their
lives in place of those who died no matter how unrealistic it truly was.52 This blame largely came
from the fact that many who were neither partisans nor Fascist soldiers were witness to other
citizens dying in their place. Since partisans were living within Italian society, they were the
easiest to blame for the violence of the Nazis who killed without differentiation. This blame gave
rise to the questioning of the Resistance movement of the war. The logic of those who
experienced these massacres was focused largely on the fact that if there was nothing to fight
against in Italy, the Germans would not have killed innocent civilians who did not want to take
part in any aspect of the war. This then led to a debate within Italy about whether or not the
Resistance did more harm than good in terms of the killings of innocent Italians during that time.
Many blamed the partisans for acting more politically than with a military strategy and thus did
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not necessarily take into account how their actions would impact the populations around them. In
what could be described as the domino effect, this then caused many Italians who were not part
of the Resistance movement to blame the partisans for the collateral damage that would occur
while fighting the Germans. 53 Further adding to their argument, much of the time these
massacres were carried out after the killing of German soldiers, as acts of retaliation. This further
provided “proof” to Italian civilians that partisans were not only provoking attacks but were also
getting innocent Italians killed by failing to protect them from the Nazis.54 Not only were the
Nazis blamed for attacking Italy, the Italian partisans were blamed for causing this violence
within Italy in a never ending cycle of fingerpointing.
In addition to those who were justly blamed, less likely scapegoats also became part of
this victimhood rhetoric in Italy. After the fall from power, Mussolini and the Fascist
government were blamed for the pain that they had caused Italians. It was at this time that the
Allies began creating very forceful propaganda that drew a distinction between the innocent
Italians and the Fascist regime. Mussolini was solely blamed for having dragged Italy into the
war and Italy’s support of Nazi Germany.55 This idea was further fostered by the Allies who used
radio broadcasts to spread the message that Mussolini was single handedly responsible for
involving Italy in Germany’s war. These claims from the Allies were cemented into the
population’s memory when they accepted the story that Mussolini had betrayed Italy by dragging
them into a war that Italians “neither wanted nor felt”.56 This concept of blaming Mussolini only
really began when addressing the entrance of Fascist Italy into the war with the Germans. During
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this time, Mussolini was exclusively blamed for joining the war on the side of the Nazis. This
way, Italy was able to absolve itself of any wrongdoing and further play as “a political victim of
Fascism.”57 Adding to this idea that Mussolini and Fascism held all the power, crimes that were
committed during the war would not be considered “Italian crimes,” but rather “Fascist crimes”
that were committed only by Fascists, not by ordinary Italians.58 In this way, Italy was able to
accept certain atrocities so long as they could blame it on a higher power that supported the
notion that it was beyond their control.
During the time of the war, Italy had claimed Yugoslavia and parts of Croatia as occupied
territories. Unsurprisingly, this did not sit well with many who lived in these countries leading to
many skirmishes and casualties on both sides. However, these clashes have become ingrained in
Italian society as massacres which further reinforced Italy’s status as a victim. These massacres,
or foibe in Italian, were seen as unprovoked attacks on the part of the Slavs who wanted to export
Communism to Italy. There was an exaggeration of the numbers of those killed in the foibe
perhaps to further this sense of victimhood within Italy.59 In fact, this idea was propagated
through several TV series that dealt with the foibe. On these television shows, the foibe were
portrayed as as the “Italian Holocaust” further allowing this narrative to continue on into the
early 2000s.60 Slavs were seen as the aggressor who had genocidal ambitions against the Italians
and were threatening Italian democracy.61 Despite innocent people who died in the foibe, the
majority of those who were fighting the Slavs were Italian Fascists who had hoped to colonize
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Istria. The Istrian peninsula has a long history of much contention between Yugoslavia and Italy.
During the foibe, Italian Fascists had wanted to reclaim the Peninsula as a part of Venezia Giulia.
62

Throughout this time of massacres and constant fighting, the Slavs and Italians were in

competition to declare who the “real” victim of the foibe was. While it is true that both sides
suffered greatly, it was the totalitarian regimes of each country that caused this nationalist fight.63
Both sides suffered from their governments mutual aggression but Italy exaggerated their sense
of victimhood to sustain the myth that they had done nothing wrong.
The Italians have proven to be masters of scapegoating which ultimately lead to the myth
of the “good Italian.” This myth stems from the idea that the Italians were not the aggressors in
the war, but rather were often the victim of aggression from others. The myth is a recurring
theme has been accepted by the various different countries and people that Italy blamed for the
war which ties everything together. When Italy was fighting with the Germans, Italy placed the
sole blame on Mussolini despite his wide ranging popularity at that time. Once Mussolini fell,
much of the blame unsurprisingly was directly and vehemently aimed at the Germans for
overtaking northern Italy. Surprisingly, there was a good amount of pressure put on the partisans,
by non partisan Italians, who were fighting the Germans. Many viewed the partisans as
provoking the attacks by the Germans, and that the partisans failed to protect the innocent from
the Germans. Italy also blamed Yugoslavia for the foibe which were horrible attacks carried out
against ethnic Italians living in the area, forgetting and forgiving the brutality of their
colonization of the region much as they had done in Africa. Although their self victimization on
the side of the foibe is not without merit, their victimization denies any wrongdoing on the side
Gaia Baracetti, “Foibe: Nationalism, Revenge and Ideology in Venezia Giulia and Istria, 1943-5” Journal of
Contemporary History 44, no. 4 (2009) 665.
63
Baracetti, “Fiobe.”
62

27

of the Italians in Yugoslavia. This common idea of “il bravo italiano,” the good Italian, has
further reinforced Italy’s argument that they were the victim of outside aggression and did no
wrong during the war. This common narrative virtually absolved Italy from any culpability of
their own aggression during the war.

28

Chapter 2

The Lega Nord and Self Victimization
“I am the savior of Italy.” -Umberto Bossi64
The language of self victimization and use of historical amnesia was not only prevalent
during and post Fascism, but has also carried forward into modern day Italy. Immediately after
Fascism fell in Italy, there was an urge to forget what had happened and what Fascism had done
in the name of national unity. Even as recently as the late 2000s, there was still an active desire
as a people to ignore Italy’s involvement with Fascism during World War II in order to continue
the narrative of being the victim.65 This was further evidenced by the split between public and
private memory in the years following the war. The public and state funded monuments often
clashed with local memories of events. As John Foot writes in his book, “The state failed to
acknowledge different narratives while local people contested the versions of history presented
down to them in their town squares and history books.”66 This clash between the government and
the locals only exacerbated a more bitter divide between the two. These debates concerning the
varying memories most often occurred within churches. In the years following the war, there was
a general consensus on what narrative would be accepted into the mainstream. These stories
were further legitimized by appearing in films, song books and even in public commemorations.
By carefully choosing what memories of the war to keep, Italy continued to propagate a sense of
victimization with no push back for many, many years.
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It wasn’t until the 1980s that much of the narratives previously accepted about the war
era came under scrutiny. During this time, many historians were called upon to reveal the truth of
what had really happened during the war. With these contestations of public memory, much of
the public was in crisis about what to believe. These historians were seen as a way to resolve
these disputed memories.67 However, this was not an easy proposition for many Italians to
accept. As the truth about the atrocities committed by Italians began to emerge, many citizens
were not willing to accept this as fact. In one particular case during which a massacre was carried
out by the Nazis in 1945, in Collegno, many Fascists along with partisans died. Since this town
was ashamed that there were still Fascists in Italy even after Mussolini fell, this massacre was
actively forgotten by the townspeople. It wasn’t until 1999 that an historian, Bruno Maida, began
to uncover the truth about this massacre and set about reminding the citizens of this town of its
painful past. He was set to present on his book dedicated to the findings of the true nature of that
massacre but was met by a boycott by the locals who were not yet ready to acknowledge their
Fascist past. This only served to continue the “silent memory” and defensive attitude of the town.
68

This is but one example of the willful ignorance chosen by many towns when confronted with

the memories of the war.
Not only were events that occurred in Italy buried with the hope of never being
uncovered, but atrocities that happened abroad were also carefully vetted in order to decide
which ones should be brought to light. Naturally, the consequence of picking and choosing
historical tragedies only served to sustain Italy’s role as that of the victim. On a Greek island,
Cefalonia, in 1943, right around the time that Mussolini fell, there were many clashes between
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Italian and German armies. These clashes mainly happened because Italy had changed sides first
as allies to the Germans to then becoming enemies. During this time, many Italian soldiers were
killed or taken prisoner by the Germans who viewed the Italians as traitors who had suddenly
turned on their former allies. These events were largely debated within the public arena and often
manipulated in order to produce a specific narrative of being a political act when in reality, it is
not so clear. Despite the events in Cefalonia being heroic acts against Germany, they were the
exception rather than the rule of Italians who were abroad when Mussolini fell and Italy joined
the Allies. During this time, many other Italians either gave up fighting or deserted the war effort
entirely. It was as though the war was completely over for them. The events of Cefalonia were
carefully chosen to be remembered in order to portray Italy as the hero of the war rather than
changing sides after Mussolini fell. The events at Cefalonia were not forgotten in quite the same
way that other massacres have been, yet there have been debates over whether or not it has been
overlooked. Since it has become so politicized, the true reality of what happened there
overshadows what has happened in other places outside of Italy.69 By cherry picking which
events would be remembered Italy and its government have effectively erased the truth behind
what went on abroad after the fall of Mussolini. This serves to sustain the myth of the “good
Italian” and presents Italian soldiers as being on the right side of the war.
This current day amnesia surrounding the events of World War II has created the
opportunity for political parties to use the same language of self victimization that Fascism had
used. In the early 1990s, a new party, called the Lega Nord, was created that focused on the
riches of northern Italy. This party, created by Umberto Bossi, was founded as a secessionist
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party whose ultimate goal was for northern Italy to become its own republic. The main argument
was that southern Italy, a historically agrarian community, was draining the more business
oriented north of its resources. Initially, the party had little support, mainly in certain alcoves in
the north.70 However, over the years, it has grown more and more popular nationwide, especially
due to Italy’s struggling economy. Today the party is run by Matteo Salvini after Bossi resigned
under corruption allegations. Salvini has turned the party’s original platform from secessionist to
nationalist. Although there has been no official comment on why the Lega made the shift, the
recent influx of immigrants coming to Italy has provided the party a fresh new ideological battle
front, reviving a previously faltering Lega.71 This nationalist shift has created a stronger Lega
than in years past giving the party overall a more serious profile nationally. Within the Lega’s
platform, one can find many rhetorical parallels to Fascism, including using the language of self
victimization. Within this chapter, I hope to link the case of historical amnesia to the rhetoric of
self-victimization, drawing a parallel to Fascism.
When the Lega was founded by Bossi in the early 1990s, he was advocating for an option
that northern Italy had never considered before in modern day politics: a chance to secede from
the rest of Italy. The fundamental platform of this party was that northern Italy was being held
back by southern Italy due to the widespread poverty of the south. This divide largely stems from
northern Italy being much more economically advanced in large part due to their technological
advances and proximity to the rest of Europe. Southern Italy remains comparatively agrarian and
rural with fewer sophisticated economic opportunities. The party’s main argument, that the south
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was holding northern Italy back, formed an interesting rhetoric which seemed almost
counterintuitive. The party began to focus on how much more prosperous northern Italy would
be if southern Italy were forced to support itself instead of relying on the north. From the
moment it was created, the Lega Nord used this idea of northern Italy being the victim of
southern Italy: “The deep-rooted foundations of leghismo cannot be understood unless we
recognize its great ability to make a political use of Northern Italy’s victim-playing.”72 Thus with
the creation of this new political party, the language of self victimization was once again being
used in Italian national politics.
This idea that northern Italians had a separate “ethnic” identity from other Italians set up
the new direction the party was headed in. As Tomelleri writes:
Toward the end of the 1990s, this localism and the demand for an ethnic identity for the
‘northern people’ situated in the mythical ‘Padania’ also became a way to channel the
growing racism relating to the immigration of non-EU citizens that, at that time, was
turning into an unheard-of social phenomenon, in terms of both the quantity of flows,
with respect to the recent past, and the cultural and political debate to which it gave rise.73
As the party began to gain in popularity and recognition, a simultaneous shift in the rhetoric
began to take place, as well. Southern Italy was still being held accountable as the main culprit
for draining northern Italy’s resources, while a parallel grievance began emerging with the rise of
non-EU immigration in Italy. The novelty of this immigration gave the Lega an opportunity to
expand its ideology from that of a secessionist party to a nationalist one. In this way the Lega
would not only gain more national attention, it would gain national support as well, legitimizing
it as a national political party rather than a fringe group. With this new party platform, Bossi
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turned the attention to the new influx of immigrants as possible scapegoats for Italy’s struggles.74
The Lega was still able to maintain its original populist platform but consequently gained a
bigger and broader group of supporters. This language and new anti-immigrant ideology of the
Lega continued throughout Bossi’s time as the leader of the party.
With this rhetoric and ideological change, Bossi’s party began to invoke language of self
victimization at a national level, much like they had done before with southern Italy. Now
instead of focusing on southern Italy as the culprit for draining Italy’s resources, the focus shifted
to new immigrants, especially those of color. His focus on the “invasion of blacks and Arabs”
was gaining attention from the rest of Italy.75 By harnessing the rising fear among Italians of a
changing Italy, Bossi was able to successfully begin transforming the party into a nationalist
party that was to be taken seriously. Additionally, the Lega was able to maintain such an openly
anti immigrant, and at times, racist rhetoric based largely on the fact that it was still considered a
fringe party with no serious ties to already well established parties. By not being held to the same
standard as other parties, the Lega was able to continue this rhetoric largely unchallenged by
other parties within Italy. In fact, Bossi has gone so far to accuse “established parties of wanting
to transform Italy into a ‘multiracial [multirazziale], multiethnic, and multireligious society’
which ‘comes closer to hell than to paradise.’”76 Again, the fringe status of the Lega allowed it to
get away with critiquing all other mainstream parties in Italy. This type of language, though
shocking in its overt racism, was nothing new for this group. Bossi constantly made headlines for
his crass and unhindered way of speaking. As he played on the fears of Italians who for

Tomelleri, “Toward a Sociology of Ressentiment,” 123.
Betz, “The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe,” 682.
76
Hans-George Betz, “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe,”
Comparative Politics 25 no. 4 (1993) 417.
74
75

34

generations have enjoyed a more or less homogenous society, he was able to focus the blame not
only on others such as immigrants, but also on mainstream Italian parties, who he felt were
complicit or ineffective. By framing the party’s platform in this way, he was able to gain support
for his general claims blaming those around him for Italy’s hardships while managing to avoid
any real solutions to these supposed problems.
Notwithstanding Bossi’s targeting of immigration as the new source of Italy’s problems,
he also attacked the mainstream government as a way to continue to blame those around him.
Remember, the party was originally founded on the idea that southern Italy was draining
northern Italy of its resources. And now the party also blamed mainstream government parties
for the middle class’s problems and lack of upward mobility. He was able to convince his
supporters that “the Italian lower middle and middle classes imagine themselves imprisoned by
the centralist bureaucracy of the nation-state” since the national debt created economic
hardships.77 Since the Lega was focused on a more localized approach to government, they were
able to appeal to Italians who felt left behind by the centralist government. Even though this
obscured the fact that many small to medium sized companies profited from the corruption of
local politicians and tax evasion, the Lega was able to convince those around them that this was
better than having the stagnant central government be in control.78 In this way, the Lega was
once again able to focus the blame on others when in fact, the Lega did little to help decrease the
actual frustrations of the middle class.
Beyond this, the Lega was able to focus on the narcism and privilege that many of their
constituents have and was able to successfully use this to their advantage. Tomelleri writes,
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“Umberto Bossi and the leghista movement fueled the belief that an inner circle of people
possessing an enormous amount of power used ‘dishonest’ means to hold back and marginalize
those below them who were aspiring to greater social prestige.”79 In this way, Bossi was able to
convince the majority of his voter base that those who currently held the power were holding
back those who wanted to have the chance of upward mobility. By blaming the centralist
government for the middle class’s problems, the Lega was able to avoid offering any plausible
solutions while gaining support for their populist movement. In their success, the Lega was able
to make their voter base feel superior when, in fact, they were in the same situation as other
Italians. Tomelleri adds, “The victimization stirred up by the Lega Nord movement requires an
instrumental use of those who consider themselves superior or privileged.”80 Since he was able to
convince his constituents that they were the ones being oppressed due to their “superiority,”
Bossi was able to attract well educated yet narcissistic people to his party. By having a fairly
well educated voter base, the Lega was beginning to be taken more seriously within the world of
politics instead of being viewed as simply a fringe group in northern Italy. By convincing these
citizens to blame the central government for their lack of economic status despite being superior,
Bossi and the Lega were able to gain legitimacy in the political world while offering no real
solutions to Italy’s stagnation.
This push towards a more nationalist type of party goes hand in hand with forgetting the
wrongdoings of the past. In order for nationalism to flourish there must be “strong emphasis on
law and order, a return to traditional values, and an end to the confrontation with the past,” and
instead focuses on blaming others for their own country’s hardships.81 Within the rhetoric put
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forth by these kinds of parties, there is always a desire to forget the past, especially when it is
similar to the path that these nationalist parties take must take in order to be successful.
Especially in Italy, we see a lack of confronting the nationalist rise of Fascism which is quite
similar as that of the Lega. A big part of the similarities between the rise of these two groups has
been the use of self victimization terminology when discussing Italy’s difficulties. By employing
this type of language, both parties were able to gain popular support while simultaneously
avoiding any blame for the consequences of their own actions. Since they were both able to
pinpoint the blame of Italy’s hardships on those around them, they were able to avoid any
meaningful way of addressing the deeper issues the country faced. This method has proven to be
quite effective when dealing with any critique of Italy such as being portrayed as weak or lesser
than other countries within Europe.
After Bossi resigned following a corruption scandal in 2012 that rippled throughout the
Lega Nord, the party was then overtaken by Matteo Salvini.82 After Salvini took over, the party
moved closer than ever before to becoming a nationalist party. In doing so, Salvini began to
implement a new way of using a similar language of self victimization to his benefit. He took
office just as the immigration crisis in Europe was at an all time high. He was able to use this
fear of immigrants to his political benefit. Although Bossi had begun heading in this direction
with the Lega prior to his fall, Salvini fully abandoned any type of lingering secessionist agenda
and fully embraced the Lega as a nationalist movement. He has taken on the same trend as Bossi
by using the same type of rhetoric blaming the influx of immigrants for Italy’s difficulties. Not
only is he using the language of self victimization by directly implicating poor and uprooted
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immigrants, he has also been blaming the European Union for their lack of support. He regularly
makes sweeping claims that Italy has been abandoned by the EU and left to deal with the influx
of immigrants on their own. By carrying on this legacy of using self victimization, he is also able
to continue to gain supporters despite the fact that the Lega remains by en large a protest party
without a realistic plan for bettering the lives of their constituents.
Along the same lines as Bossi, Salvini has used anti immigrant, and at times, racist
language when claiming Italy is the victim of organized mass immigration. He has been known,
much like Bossi, to say whatever is on his mind no matter how “politically incorrect” his views
may seem. When speaking about the problem of immigration in Italy, Salvini often uses
language reminiscent of conspiracy, almost as though this influx of immigrants arriving in Italy
as a gateway to the rest of Europe is somehow purposeful and malicious in intent. In August
2016, Salvini spoke in front of a crowd of Lega supporters during which time he blathered on
about how Italians were being unfairly harmed due to the influx of immigrants. Matteo
Pucciarelli, a journalist for La Repubblica, wrote, “The secretary of the Lega is speaking about
‘controlled and financed ethnic cleansing’... Italians are suffering, oppressed by ‘illegal
immigrants.’”83 This thinly veiled way of blaming immigrants of color for Italy’s hardships is
just another footstep following in line of his predecessor, Bossi. He is claiming that these
immigrants are causing great harm to Italians while offering no meaningful solutions as to how
to deal with this influx. He is also subtly attacking the government claiming that, by allowing
large numbers of immigrants into the country, they are allowing a “controlled” cleansing of
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Italian people. In this way, much like Bossi, Salvini is using the language of self victimization in
dealing with immigration while focusing on the misdoings of the current government. He is able
to gain popular support for blaming those around him while failing to offer a way to deal with
this influx of immigrants.
Salvini has harnessed this anti immigration rhetoric and used it to undermine support for
the European Union within Italy. He did not want to ally his country with other members of the
EU simply because they were somewhat more welcoming to refugees pouring into Europe. In
addition to Greece, Italy has been a major entry point for many immigrants coming to Europe.
Many in Italy have felt as though the European Union has not adequately helped Italy in dealing
with the influx of these immigrants. The Lega has used this sentiment to its advantage, openly
bashing the EU whenever possible. In a recent vote to change the Italian Constitution, the Lega
and other anti establishment parties voted against this referendum, partially due to the fact that it
would strengthen Italy’s ties with the EU. When the referendum failed, Salvini touted it not only
as a win for the Lega, but also a “big slap to the EU since we were left alone with immigration.”
84

In this way, Salvini was able to place the blame not just on the current government within

Italy, but also on the EU for ignoring the plight of Italy having become overwhelmed by
immigrants. In fact, he went so far to say the the EU was supporting this influx of immigrants
due to the shared laws within the European Union as well as the shared currency of the Euro. In
an interview with Geopolitika, he said, “This crisis, this disaster, has been artificially induced
and in essence this artificial cataclysm consists of four letters: e-u-r-o.”85 By blaming the EU
beyond just the Italian government, Salvini was able to harness much of the displeasure many
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have had with the workings of the EU in relation to Italy. Many have embraced this anti EU
sentiment and have turned to populist parties within Italy to fix what they see as an injustice to
their country. Since Salvini and the Lega have been able to garner support in their displeasure for
the EU, they have been able to maintain this “anti” approach while offering no real solutions.
Though Salvini claims to be in favor of Italy leaving the EU, he has offered little to no
explanation as to how that would happen. In this way, he is still able to continue this rhetoric of
Italy being treated unfairly by those around them while offering no solutions to what he
perceives to be problems.
This language of self victimization has begun to move beyond the politicians within the
Lega and leach into the general public. Naturally, this causes an increase in anti-immigrant
sentiment as well as the corresponding feeling of being victimized by the very same immigrants.
This issue has largely been prevalent in southern Italy due to its geographical location as a fairly
accessible entry point for many immigrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Lampedusa is an
Italian island in the middle of the Mediterranean which has dealt with the brunt of these African
arrivals due to its location: it is only 70 miles from Tunisia but over 120 miles away from Sicily.
Lampedusa has felt a great economic and social burden dealing with the sheer number of
immigrants who pass through regularly. Many of those who live on the island were born and
raised there, creating a deep sense of community and culture that is particular to the island. As a
result, many who live there have had a difficult time dealing with this new turbulence and strain
on the island. As a result of the influx, the islanders have been quick to blame the immigrants for
the cause of all their problems. However, this language profoundly echoes a similar rhetoric of
self victimization. One woman in her 50s said, “So it is right that we are stingy with those who
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land here. And also, I am opposed to crime because these arrivals are violent, they kill each
other, and we, in Lampedusa, want to rest easy because they come at night, entering homes and
we are frightened.”86 These fears have largely been unfounded as many who enter the EU
through Lampedusa only use the island as an entry point and actually do not stay for very long.
Yet since many immigrants do pass through Lampedusa, one can understand that this sense of
fear exists amongst native Lampedusians.
As is true elsewhere in Italy, the Lampedusians feel that they have been left to deal with
the immigration situation while they are facing longstanding problems of their own. One woman
who has lived on the island her whole life stated that, “Now there is too much confusion with all
these Turks. The tourists, I don’t mind, but all these Moroccans, Tunisians...I do not like it!
There's too much mess, Lampedusa has become a wreck.”87 This woman speaks for many who
feel that many outsiders either do not or cannot see the struggle that Lampedusa is facing.
Furthermore, the racial component of her dissatisfaction cannot be overlooked: she uses the
derogatory term “Turks” to refer to all the immigrants coming from North Africa to Lampedusa.
A supporter of the Lega who lives in Lampedusa wants the island to focus on solving its own
problems, such as its economic hardships, before helping immigrants. For this supporter the
current emergency is not the fact that there are immigrants coming to shore, it is that there has
not been enough fresh water for those on the island. He feels as though the city has only partially
remedied the problem when in reality he is losing business because he can not open his
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restaurant.88 Many islanders do not view themselves as racists for not wanting the immigrants
there. They simply feel as though the immigrants are not part of their culture and add great strain
to the island infrastructure. As one native simply put it, “They are not like us.”89 This particular
woman points out that these immigrants are trying to come to Italy yet are not Italians. So, like
so many of her neighbors, she does not see “the other” as having the right to live there and add to
their burden. She purports that it is the work of God when some of them do not make it to the
island alive. Thus, the focus of the crisis is thrust back onto the Islanders, who identify as the
victims of this situation instead of those fleeing their home countries in desperation.
This anti immigration sentiment is not unique to Lampedusa, but is clearly prevalent
throughout Italy. Calabria, the region located at the toe of the boot of Italy, has similarly been
faced with rescuing migrants coming to their shore. Yet, how they address this “problem” is
quite devious and immoral. In Calabria, there is a very powerful organized crime group called
the ‘Ndrangheta, which has been controlling much of the local economy and criminal activities
for several decades. Recently the ‘Ndrangheta have taken on this new and vulnerable population
by taking advantage of them. The group has begun setting up orange groves in order to gain state
subsidies, and in turn hiring illegal immigrants to work for them. Naturally, they can pay below
wage and because they are illegal immigrants, there are no possible protections for them.90 Since
these immigrants are willing to take these jobs, many locals see it as the immigrants stealing jobs
that rightfully belong to Italians. However, since there has been a negative population growth,
especially in southern Italy, this influx of immigrants is actually vital to counteract this negative
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growth. In southern Italy there is high demand for harvesters during the summer months, but the
local labor force cannot sustain the amount of work there is.91 Therefore the idea that these
immigrants are taking away jobs from Italians is simply untrue. However, this belief is shared
among many in southern Italy who see the ‘Ndrangheta taking advantage of cheap labor. In
addition to exploiting these immigrants, the ‘Ndrangheta has also recently taken to harassing
these immigrants as a way of forcing them to join their group. As Corrado writes, “‘Hitting
niggers’ is interpreted as an ‘initiation rite’ for young people aspiring to become members of the
‘Ndrangheta.”92 It is a very disturbing relationship. The immigrants need money and the
‘Ndrangheta exploits this need because they also rely on the immigrants to work for them. They
take advantage of the fact that they cannot go to the police. This emboldens them to wield their
power over the perhaps naive immigrants and harass them for initiation. Since the ‘Ndrangheta
has been so powerful in Calabria for so long, it has not seemed possible for non members to
challenge them into hiring legal Italian citizens. In this way, the citizens of Calabria, as well as
the illegal immigrants, both lose to the power of the ‘Ndrangheta and its ability to manipulate a
situation to its benefit.
Further north in central Italy, Rome has experienced an uptick of abuse against
immigrants. Recently, a Moroccan family was moving into their new apartment when they were
met with racist epithets from other inhabitants of that complex. A family of native Italians began
shouting, “Go away from here Negroes, we don’t want foreigners, go back home with your
rubber dinghy!”93 While this situation was met with public criticism from many powerful
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officials, this is not new behavior within Italy. There has been a slew of documented outbursts in
which people have shouted hateful slurs such as, “We do not want Negroes nor foreigners here,
but only Italians.”94 It is true that these Italians are not necessarily invoking a specific rhetoric of
self victimization, yet their racist views only hint at a deep and pervasive feeling of being
oppressed and burdened themselves. Their language closely mirrors that of the Lega and other
anti immigrant political groups who, in turn, take this type of rhetoric one step further implying
that it is these immigrants, and these immigrants only, who are harming Italy and its culture.
The issues of self victimization and selective memory regarding Fascism has allowed
Italy to paint itself as the victim of outside forces. As recently as present day, Italy has carefully
selected only particular memories of the war to study or commemorate and just as carefully
suppressed or denied others in an effort to maintain its sense of victimhood. Perhaps the shame
and guilt of having sided with one of the most heinous war criminals in history has caused Italy
to conveniently forget the wrongs they, too, have committed and instead focused on the few
massacres they experienced after joining forces with the Allies. This rhetoric of historical
amnesia surrounding the events of World War II further legitimized its use when the Lega Nord
was founded in the 1990s. The Lega fully embraced this language in order to gain popular
support for their new party and to lay the foundation of the party’s main goals which was to have
northern Italy secede from the south due to their impoverishment and lack of resources. They
employed this language of self victimization to illustrate how southern Italy was draining
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resources and money from the more economically prosperous north. However, the Lega enjoyed
a much broader support base once they switched focus away from just the south of Italy to the
new problem of immigrants flocking to Italy. In the mid to late 1990s, Italy began facing a new
immigration coming from Northern Africa by way of the Mediterranean Sea. With this new
development, the Lega began to transform from its secessionist roots to focus on keeping Italy
“Italian.”
This new change caused the Lega to embrace a very similar rhetoric to that of Fascism.
Knowingly or not, the Lega largely borrowed from Fascism’s similar language of blaming those
around them for issues beyond their control. This technique became particularly popular in terms
of addressing the immigration crisis in recent years. The Lega was able to modify the rhetoric
they had originally used for secessionism to now blame immigrants coming from Third World
countries. This method of self victimization has proven quite effective for the Lega. In this way,
they are able to garner public support by placing the blame on those around them, such as the EU
and the immigrants themselves, while failing to better the country’s situation. This rhetoric has
proven to be so effective, in fact, that it has had a trickle down effect into the general population.
Amongst native Italians, there has been an increase in hateful and fearful language against
immigrants which mirrors that of the Lega. This fear has lead to hate crimes and calling out
racial epithets against new immigrants in Italy. This self victimization that has been perpetuated
by the Lega has only further caused this historical amnesia of Fascism to continue: “Asking
questions about the state in this way, through immigration, ultimately means 'denaturalizing,' so
to speak, what is considered 'natural' and 'to re-historicize' the state, or what in the state seems to
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have been hit by historical amnesia.”95 In this way, the language of self victimization used in
Fascism is inextricably linked to that used by the Lega today.
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Chapter 3

Religion
“Fascism is a religion.” - Benito Mussolini96
Christianity has always been the religion of Italy. When one thinks of Italy or what it
means to be Italian, Christianity, and specifically Catholicism, has always been essential feature.
During the time of Fascism, this fact was no different. In his youth, and into the early beginnings
of Fascism, Mussolini had considered himself to be atheist and anti-religion. He was originally
so against religion that when he first founded the Fascist Party, he called for an end to state
subsidies to the Church and published articles in his Fascist newspaper about his hatred of
Christianity.97 However, after an abysmal performance in the first round of elections after the
party was founded, Mussolini realized he would have to change his relationship with the Church
in order to gain any kind of public support. After this realization, he began to speak out publicly
in favor of Catholicism and the Church. He made sure to emphasize the fact that Catholicism
was a large part of Italian culture and an integral part as to what it meant to be Italian.98 After he
came to power, he began meeting with the Pope to ensure that the Church would endorse
Fascism and continue on with a symbiotic relationship throughout the period of Fascism.99 Once
Mussolini was able to accept this as part of his party’s platform, Fascism became unstoppable in
its rise to power.
Similarly to Fascism, the Lega and its leaders also have a complicated relationship with
the Church and the Pope. However, since the relationship between the two is still in flux to this
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day, it has been more difficult to find a clearly linked path of communication between the them.
While Umberto Bossi was in power, he was rather elusive and nonchalant when asked about his
religious beliefs. Though he considered himself Catholic, he identified more as an agnostic than
anything else.100 In more recent developments, Matteo Salvini has found himself in a rather
precarious situation in dealing with the current Pope’s pro immigrant and refugee stance while
trying to maintain the Catholicism that is so closely held to Italian society. Though there is not as
much explicit evidence of the Lega dealing with this complex relationship, they have addressed
the issues of religion in Italy through proxy language, especially when discussing the issue of
immigration in Italy. Throughout this section, I will draw comparisons between both Fascism’s
and the Lega’s complicated connections with Catholicism and its embeddedness in Italian
culture. This specific connection between the Church and the political parties has shown how
integrated Catholicism is in Italian culture. It also shows how necessary it is for these parties to
acknowledge its importance in order to have a strong following.
As a child, Mussolini had identified as atheist due to his father’s disdain for religion.101
As he grew up, his father’s influence proved to be quite powerful on the young man. His father
was a staunch socialist who was anti-religion, almost the complete opposite of his wife, who
herself was deeply religious. Once Mussolini moved on from his early socialist beliefs, he turned
to Fascism and found his passion. During this time, he was still anti-religion, and therefore,
anti-Catholicism. However, he quickly learned that in order to succeed on the larger scale, he
must accept the fact that Italy was a mostly Catholic nation with strong, long held beliefs. Once
Mussolini was officially elected into power, it seemed as though they would have a difficult time
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dealing with the Pope, Pius XI, since he very openly wanted to protect the Italian Jews within
Italy.102 Mussolini was able to avoid this potential problem by meeting with the Pope in the early
days of Fascist rule in Italy. In these meetings, they mostly negotiated what each side would do
for the other. Thanks to his change in tune regarding the Church before Fascism gained enough
power, Mussolini was forced to continue to keep up appearances with the Church. He claimed
that Fascism would restore a Catholic state, nation and society after the messy ending of the last
government in charge.103 As a result, Mussolini was able to manipulate the Church into
supporting him in order to establish a symbiotic relationship between the two. Mussolini
threatened violence against the Church should they come out against Fascism, but if the Church
complied, Fascism would hold back the black shirts from committing acts of violence against the
Church.104 This instance began the long lasting relationship between the Church and Mussolini.
Once elected, Mussolini continued to keep up appearances that he was a good Catholic
who respected the Church. As Prime Minister, he forced his Cabinet members to pray in order to
show the Pope that he was a good Catholic and that Fascism supported the Church. Though this
act was more for show than anything else, this method proved effective with Pius XI. Many
within the Church were surprised that this obvious attempt to get the Pope’s support was actually
working. Many in the Church at the time believed Fascism to be a violent and anti-Christian
party. Yet, none of them were able to sway the Pope’s desire to form a positive connection
between the Church and Fascism.105 Mussolini was also able to continue to prove to the Pope that
he would make good in his promises to protect the Church. When there was a spell of
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anti-clerical violence within Italy, Mussolini was able to manipulate the situation in his favor and
promote himself as a defender of the Church. Though this violence was committed by Fascists,
Mussolini was able to successfully and quickly put an end to it.106 Once this bridge had been
crossed, it was all but final that the Church and Fascism would have a long and symbiotic
relationship together.
After the relationship solidified between the two, both the Church and Mussolini used
this new connection to their benefit. On the Church’s side, they received a new library from
Mussolini and the Italian government while he was still “courting” the Pope, so to speak. Since
the Pope was a former librarian in one of the Vatican’s many libraries, this gift payed off
handsomely for Mussolini when it finally came to the elections in 1924.107 The Church publically
endorsed Mussolini after his generous gift giving. This proved to be extremely valuable for the
Fascists; since they were able to win the election with the Church’s endorsement, amongst other
things, they were inclined to continue this relationship beyond its current state. Along with these
gifts, there were also promises made between the two parties. Mussolini promised to control
those who wanted to commit violence against the Church, and in return, the Church promised to
not only endorse Mussolini, but to help him uphold this desired image of the Duce as a good,
Catholic Italian.108 With these generous gifts to one another and the promises made, both the
Church and Mussolini had officially entered into a committed relationship.
Though the relationship between the two men surprised many, both the Pope and
Mussolini had many characteristics in common. Both men were known to be stubborn, difficult
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and demanding until they got their way.109 Also, both were vehemently anti Socialist and
Communist. This is more than just a superficial connection between the two men. Though
Mussolini began his political career as a Socialist due to his father’s socialist beliefs, once he
changed his political affiliation, he viewed both Socialism and Communism as weak ideologists
and became vehemently opposed to them. Similarly, the Pope and the Church were very much
against any chance of a Communist or Socialist party gaining power in Italy linked by anti
Socialism. At the time when Mussolini was coming to power, there was also a very real threat
from the far left due to popular disdain for the parties that had been in power for so long before
the government was dissolved. A factor in the Church’s decision to support and openly endorse
Fascism was to prevent a Communist government from taking hold.110 After Mussolini was
elected, Giacomo Matteotti, a very prominent Socialist in Italian politics, was murdered. Though
there were no direct ties to Mussolini, many suspected that he played a role in it. However, the
Pope stood by Mussolini and warned Italian Catholics to never cooperate with Socialists.111 With
the support of the Pope, Mussolini was able to hang onto power and prevent any possibility of
being overthrown. After this bump in Mussolini’s rule, Fascism’s grip on Italy took full effect.
With his relationship with the Pope strong and solid, Mussolini decided to fully embrace
his newfound appreciation for the Church. To prove to the Pope how seriously he was taking
their new alliance, he forced his wife to have a religious wedding ceremony even though she was
against it.112 Also during this time in office, Mussolini received almost constant assassination
attempts. Every time, he was able to survive them, and every time, he publicly thanked Christ for
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saving him.113 After the Pope offered Mussolini more opportunities to strengthen his regime with
further endorsement from the Church, Mussolini returned the favor by doing everything in his
power to further the idea that Catholicism was an integral part of Italian identity.114 Around this
time, the Pope and Mussolini were in talks of creating a never before made Vatican - Italian
Accord with the Church. The so-called Lateran Accord specifically stated that Catholicism was
“the only religion of the state” which in turn expanded the reach of religion even further into
daily life in Italy.115 This Accord further showed the Church’s support for Fascism and publicly
endorsed the Fascist Party as the party of the Church. Now, “Italian Catholics could have no
doubt that in supporting Mussolini, they were following the pope’s wishes.”116 Although this was
an unprecedented win for both the Church and Fascism, it was still obvious that Mussolini felt
very uncomfortable on a personal level with the Church and with priests. Despite both sides
getting their desired outcome, it was clear to both the Pope and Mussolini that Mussolini would
never fully feel like a true Catholic Italian.117
With all of this discomfort, Mussolini wound up putting his foot in his mouth on several
occasions which only enraged the Pope. When addressing Parliament freshly after the
“elections” in 1929, Mussolini was up against the impression that he was a patsy for the Pope.118
In an effort to dispel the idea that he was a puppet for the Pope, he reiterated his power and
control which happened to overlook the role of the Church in Italian society. This speech
enraged the Pope who saw Mussolini as distancing himself from the Accord they had just agreed
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on. This moment sent Mussolini into a tailspin about what was to be done. He rushed to try to
calm the Pope, but the Pope did not take his pleas seriously. The Pope was known for his bouts
of rage, and in this moment, Mussolini saw firsthand how bad they really were. After many
many meetings between the Pope and a special envoy chosen by Mussolini, the two eventually
got back onto sturdy, albeit precarious, ground.119 After this almost disastrous moment for
Mussolini, he became much more delicate with his approach in dealing with the Church and the
Pope to ensure that their relationship would continue.
Even after the signing of the Lateran Accord, there were strains between the Pope and
Mussolini. A large reason for this tension was due to rising anti Church sentiments and rebellions
against the Church from young Fascists. Mussolini responded to the Church’s outrage by
suspending all Catholic Action youth groups since he could not understand why he was being
held accountable for these young men’s actions.120 Even in this time of serious tension between
the two parties, the Pope continued supporting what he called “good Fascism” and realized that
there were “bad Fascists” who did not support the Church.121 Eventually the Pope gave in and
ended the conflict with Mussolini because he had decided that “too much was at stake” for the
two of them to continue down this path that would eventually lead to their relationship being
severed.122 This once and for all put the matter to bed as to whether or not Mussolini, who was
still uncomfortable around churches and priests, would uphold this relationship between Fascism
and the Pope. The Accord was finally seen as set in stone, and their alliance continued.
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An important part for the success of Italian Fascism is due to Mussolini’s image as a
leader for the movement. The main reason Mussolini wanted to have a successful close tie with
the Church was to ingratiate the more religious Italians. Many devout Catholics had always held
their faith very close to them and expected to see that reflected in their government. This is most
likely the reason why Mussolini went to such great lengths to prove to the Italian people that he
was serious about Catholicism and religion in the Fascist government. When he released his
autobiography in 1928, he wrote at length about his strong ties to religion as a young boy. Even
though he was never particularly religious at any point in his life, he wanted to portray to his
constituents that he was a religious man and make Catholicism a priority in his government. He
claims that when his mother died as a young man he found comfort through his faith in the
Church.123 Though he spoke about his own faith, he also spoke of how Catholicism is closely tied
to the “Italian race.” When speaking of fighting in World War I, Mussolini addresses the fact that
he felt it necessary to participate in the war to preserve its Catholicism, which is an important
aspect to the Italian race.124 Though Mussolini was not religious, or found religion to be
particularly important to him at the time, he wanted to show his supporters that he was always a
religious man who found the Catholic Church to be an extremely important aspect of Italian
culture.
Similarly to Fascism, the Lega Nord has had a strained relationship with the Church
though they consider themselves to be Christian. When Bossi founded the party, he made it clear
that though he considered himself “secular,” he got his children baptized and identified with
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Christianity. At his rallies, he would proudly shout, “We, the Padania, white and Christian!”125 In
this way, he was able to capitalize on the accepted notion that being an Italian means both being
white and Christian, a fact that perfectly fits in with the party’s original message of Northern
Italian superiority. However, though the Lega proudly proclaims its Catholic identity, there are
tensions between the Church and the Lega, specifically with Pope Francis. The Lega has
exploited this feeling of Catholicism as being an essential part of what it means to be Italian and
used this to point out one more way in which Italians differ from the majority of immigrants. In a
book called Padroni a Chiesa nostra. Venti anni di strategia religiosa della Lega Nord, the
author, Paolo Bertezzolo wrote about the connection between the Lega and the Church. He
writes, “The Lega uses the Church and Catholicism by bending both to its own strategies.”126 By
manipulating the relationship between the Church and their own party, the Lega is able to show
to its supporters that Catholicism is an important part of the party even as it clashes with the
Pope and the classic idea of what it means to be Catholic. For example, the author of this book
continues, “The Lega, however, the author explains, has a religious identity that is completely
different than that of the Gospel.”127 Since the Lega is more traditionalist than anything else, it
makes sense that they would focus on the social traditionalism rather than the religious
traditionalism of the Catholic canon.
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Though Bossi always claimed that the Lega had Christian roots, the Lega has always had
a strained relationship with a number of Popes throughout his history.128 Bossi had many
negative feelings towards Pope John Paul II and the direction he moved the Church towards.
Bossi did not hold back when John Paul II was in charge, and in fact said, “With the Polish pope,
the church is going backwards...the people of Padania should cut the cord with the Church and
Unions.”129 His feelings toward this Pope were largely negative due to his slightly more
progressive view than Bossi had wanted from the Church. In fact, he even threatened to change
relations with the Church due to its ideals. The Padanian newspaper published a quote stating
that, “The church must change or we revise our covenants” with the Church and the Pope.130
Despite all of the difficulty Bossi faced with balancing both embracing a Christian identity while
slamming the Pope for not being traditional enough, Bossi was able to pull it off with his
followers. Bossi was able to use the beginnings of the current immigration crisis to further
highlight the idea of Italy being Catholic and white. Bossi was well known for being outspoken,
and often even openly racist, while leader of the Lega. In 2003, Bossi proclaimed that there
would be “no house for the ‘bingo-bongo.’”131 He later explained what a “bingo-bongo” was by
using rather racially insensitive terms. Bingo-bongo was a character on in a movie released in the
early 1980s who Bossi described as “a kind, little Negro.”132 In this case, Bossi is using a movie
which portrays a black character to make clear that Italy will not house immigrants of color who
hope to live in Italy. According to the platform of the Lega, besides Catholicism being an
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important part of Italian identity, there is also this idea of Italy as a white nation. Though Bossi
was not in power for much longer after the immigration crisis began to grip Italy, he already
began to show how the Lega negotiated its Catholic identity due to the slightly more progressive
Pope.
By the time Salvini came to power, in 2012, Italy was dealing with an influx of
immigrants while dealing with one of the most progressive Popes in recent history, Pope Francis.
With this new Pope and his high approval within the Catholic community, Salvini has faced
many difficult situations in denouncing the Pope’s favorable attitude towards immigrants coming
to Italy while maintaining this idea of Italy as a Catholic nation. Salvini has so far been
successful in denouncing the liberal Pope without denouncing Catholicism as a whole. In a post
written on Facebook, Salvini said, “The Pope wants to invite thousands of immigrants in Italy?
One thing is to accommodate the few who run away from the war, another to stimulate and fund
an unprecedented invasion. Dear Holy Father, the catastrophe is a stone's throw away from the
Vatican, it is in Italy!”133 Though Salvini is seemingly denouncing the Pope and his favorable
views of immigrants coming to Italy, his is pulling the focus back onto Italy. As the Lega
transformed itself into a more nationalist party since Salvini took over, the focus of the party has
changed from northern elitism to nationalism. By focusing on Italy’s problems, Salvini is able to
criticize the Pope without directly affecting his stance on Italy being a Catholic nation.
Salvini continues to push even further with the Pope continuously, and publicly, stating
that Europe should be doing all they can to help these immigrants. He uses the widely accepted
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idea that Italy is a Catholic nation to call attention to the Pope’s position of accepting non
Christians into Italy. He has said, “The Pope is wrong to promote a dialogue with Islam,” adding:
“Peace is right, but you are the spokesman for Catholics, you should worry about who is
exterminating your brethren around the world.”134 By making these statements, Salvini is
pushing the blame onto the Pope for not denouncing Islam while also bringing up this idea of
Catholic extermination. In using this type of language, Salvini is clearly pointing to the idea that
there is a larger conspiracy which is causing these issues. He is directly attacking the Pope but in
such a way that he is still promoting Catholicism while making the argument for why non
Catholic immigrants should not be allowed in Italy. He continues this idea when he stated, “If we
must welcome immigrants, they must be Christian. While we are waiting to block this organized
invasion.”135 By not necessarily banning all immigrants, Salvini can not be portrayed as simply
racist, but rather as a protector of the Catholic aspect of the Italian culture. In this way, he is not
necessarily against people because of the color of their skin, but is instead interested in keeping
Italy a Catholic nation. By criticizing the Pope in this way, Salvini, in fact, puts himself on a
pedestal as protecting the Catholicism while accusing the Pope of not caring to uphold this
important, nationalist value.
Salvini and the Lega have continued on this trend of propping up the traditional aspects
of Catholicism that support their argument while denouncing the Pope for his progressive views.

Francesco Peloso, “La Lega sfida il Papa: il sogno di una chiesa del Nord,” Linkiesta, January 31, 2015.
http://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2015/01/31/la-lega-sfida-il-papa-il-sogno-di-una-chiesa-del-nord/24488/. “‘Il Papa
sbaglia a promuovere il dialogo con l'Islam’, ha detto il leader leghista, che poi ha aggiunto: ‘Va bene la pace, ma
sei il portavoce dei cattolici, preoccupati di chi ti sta sterminando in giro per il mondo.’”
135
Raffaello Binelli, “Immigrazione, l’ultima idea di Salvini: ‘Usiamo le piattaforme dell’Eni in disuso,” Il
Giornale, August 21, 2015.
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/immigrazione-lultima-idea-salvini-usiamo-piattaforme-delleni-1162150.html.
“Se proprio dobbiamo accogliere immigrati, che siano di religione cristiana. In attesa di bloccare questa invasione
organizzata.”
134

58

Catholicism is universal by its nature and thus the Pope, as the head of the Church, seeks to be a
leader for the entire Catholic community. In contrast, the Lega is a nationalist movement which
attempts to use religion as a political and populist tool. Even before Salvini took office in 2013,
the Lega was already upholding the idea of blocking any and all kinds of immigration. As Peloso
wrote, “the Lega has built a significant part of its own consensus on the refusal of immigration
without any kind of mediation; a strategy that has been steadily and successfully pursued for at
least thirty years since the migratory phenomenon has become stable and irreversible.”136 Much
of the Lega’s platform has been focused on immigration since it was founded around the time
that immigration was becoming an issue in Italy. Though this is not an original pillar of
Catholics who follow the Gospel closely, it has been embraced by those who wish for Italy to
stay Catholic more than anything. Peloso continues, “For many years, the Leghisti have been in
dialogue and allied with the ultra traditionalist sects of Catholicism, those who find themselves
between a rejection of the Holy See and the Pope and an uncomfortable allegiance with the
Church of Rome in spite of everything.”137 Those who are traditional Catholics, but not
necessarily religious Catholics, have aligned themselves with this party in order to maintain the
traditions of Italy. These followers are also against the Pope and his liberal acceptance of
immigrants due to the fact that many are not Catholic. These people, along with the Lega, are
focused on the traditional aspect of Catholicism in Italy more than the religious part. In this way,
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they are able to denounce the Pope and his progressive views while still feeling Catholic due to
their participation in its traditions.
It is no surprise that this difference in opinion between the Pope and the Lega,
specifically Salvini, has created such a tense relationship between the two. The Pope has been
promoting this idea of accepting immigrants no matter what their faith, while the Lega has held
onto this idea of opposing those who do not fit the criteria for what it means to be “Italian.”
Though the Lega has been criticized for not being “Catholic” in the true, religious sense of the
word, they have managed to hold on to their traditionalism. Peloso writes, “And so as the Lega
Nord looks at these almost heretical currents of Catholicism, with Pope Francis there could only
be an open clash: ecumenism, interreligious dialogue, the very concept of religious freedom in
which all faiths are respected, are unbearable concepts for Lega executives and at least part of
the people who follow them.”138 The Lega refuses to consider any kind of compromise between
the Pope and their own sense of Catholicism and nationalism. They have had no desire to even
conceptualize what religious freedom would look like within such a Catholic nation. Even within
other Christian sects, arguments have been made against uniting them closer together. The
Lega’s main priority is to keep Italy a traditionally Catholic nation, and Salvini feels as though
the Pope is directly threatening that goal.
Though he is not always confronting the Pope, Salvini continues with his anti
immigration rhetoric on a regular basis. He uses this platform as a way to further promote this
idea of an Italian ethnicity which is intertwined with religion. He has stated before that “there is
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an ongoing ethnic replacement” of Italians due to the influx of immigrants.139 In this way, Salvini
is not so subtly implying that he considers white Italians to be their own ethnicity and is claiming
that anyone who does not fit that description is purposefully trying to “replace” native Italians.
He continues, “This is an organized, financed immigration and a type of genocide.”140 Not only is
Salvini claiming that there is a conspiracy as to why Italy has been receiving all these
immigrants, but he is making the even more pointed claim that a white, Italian genocide is taking
place. Though he is not specifically pointing to religion as a part of this anti immigration
interview, he is using a more subtle way to address this idea of Italy as a white, Catholic nation.
Using this assumption, he is implying that anyone who does not fit this specific image of what it
means to be an Italian is not welcome. Not only are they not welcome, they are also causing a
great amount of harm to Italian natives and are trying to change what it means to be an Italian.
Salvini continues to use this type of proxy language to uphold the idea that Italy is a Catholic
nation.
This push for Italy to keep its Catholic roots is not singular to Italy. Throughout Europe,
we have seen the rise of nationalist parties using religion as one of their reasons for their
xenophobia. This push is most prevalent in Italy for multiple, and fairly obvious, reasons. Due to
the fact that the Vatican is inside Italy, there is obviously a much closer connection between the
Church and the rest of Italy. In addition, Italy has now become the main arrival point for many
immigrants fleeing from Africa. Both of these reasons combined has caused a spike in
xenophobic nationalism, not just in Italy, but all throughout Europe. This “xenophobic
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nationalism” within Italy is intertwined with this sense of traditional Catholicism. As Peloso so
eloquently writes:
“So it happens that a phenomenon within the Church or its borders is met with a
long-standing political trend at a European level and is increasingly materializing in these
xenophobic, sometimes racist, xenophobic nationalisms - bearers of spurious Christianity,
more linked to an ideological issue than to the Gospel message.”141
This “spurious Christianity” is exactly what Italy is currently experiencing in terms of how it is
dealing with this wave of immigration. As Peloso puts it, this idea of Christianity is more a
question of ideology than a question of religion. In Italy, there is an accepted notion that
Catholicism is part of the Italian identity. The religious aspect itself is less essential than the
traditional aspects of being Catholic. This traditional sense of what it means to be a Catholic is so
ingrained in Italian identity that the Lega has been able to successfully manipulate it to their
benefit. Though this has become a European wide phenomenon, the most important manipulation
of Catholicism is currently being used by the Lega as cause for their xenophobia.
Though tensions between the Church and the Lega could cause some issues with their
constituents, they have been able to avoid this situation by picking and choosing what aspects of
Catholicism are important to Italians. Since Catholicism is such a big part of Italian identity, the
threat of non Catholic immigrants coming to Italy has caused fear among more traditional
Italians. By the Lega harnessing the traditional aspects of Catholicism, and using using it to their
benefit, they have been able to sidestep any possibility of being perceived as anti Church despite
their public disagreements with the Pope. Since Francis became the Pope, he has come out
overwhelmingly in support for immigrants and refugees coming to European shores. Though
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Europe, and especially Italy, is generally Christian, there have been clashes with the Pope due to
his pro immigration stance. The rising xenophobia in Italy has played right into the hands of the
Lega. Though they denounce the Pope for his pro immigration attitude, they are still able to
maintain this idea of Catholicism within Italy by embracing its traditional and cultural aspects
instead of its religious core. The Lega may have a complicated relationship with the Church,
however they are able to continue the idea of Italy as being a Catholic nation while using this
manipulation to their benefit.
Similar to the xenophobic right, Fascism also grappled with their relationship with the
Church and specifically the Pope. Though it initially appeared as though Mussolini would not get
support from the Church due to his past proclamations of atheism, both he and the Pope realized
that they both needed each other for their own gain. With this in mind, the two men struck up a
deal between the two that would solidify their relationship. However, this did not come without
its own set of issues. Since Mussolini was so uncomfortable around priests and churches, he
often put his foot in his mouth when speaking publicly about faith. Yet Mussolini was persistent,
he knew that in order to get enough public support, he had to have a positive relationship with
the Church. After many close calls, the agreement between the two was signed and put into
place. From there on out, both Fascism and the Church supported each other publicly, however
privately, there were still issues between the two men. This idea of Italy being a Catholic nation
is a longstanding one with ample evidence. What I have tried to show here is how this
Catholicism has lead to the Lega repeating the same tactics of Fascism and has continued this
idea that Catholicism is an essential part of Italian identity.
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Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to bridge a gap between two similar political
moments in Italian history in a way that has not been attempted before. As I was doing my
preliminary research for this project, I kept finding similarities between Fascism and the Lega
Nord. What interested me the most about these similarities was seeing the language each used to
promote their political platform. In both parties’ rhetoric, we see this similar use of self
victimization throughout the various stages of power. Both Fascism and the Lega have used this
rhetoric to blame those around them for Italy’s hardships instead of looking at the root of the
problem. Fascism was able to manipulate this rhetoric in such a way that Mussolini was able to
maintain power, and generally to be quite popular, for 20 years. The Lega also followed suit and
used self victimization to blame the recent influx of immigrants as the source of all of Italy’s
social and political problems today. In addition to the use of self victimization, both Fascism and
the Lega have interesting relationships with the Church. Fascism had an understanding with the
Pope in order for both the Church and Fascism to gain power though Mussolini personally felt
uncomfortable with religion in general. The Lega has had a slightly different relationship with
the Pope largely because of his progressive attitude with immigration. The Lega has made an
effort to retain the traditionalist aspects of Catholicism while distancing itself from the rhetoric
of the Pope. I have shown throughout this thesis that due to these connections, historical amnesia
has helped shape the current political and social climate throughout modern in Italy.
The similarities I found between Fascism and the Lega’s use of self victimization is
almost uncanny. In both cases, the main rallying call to amass their popular support has largely
been done through this rhetoric. By creating a natural enemy against all Italians, both Fascism
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and the Lega were able to successfully garner support for their platforms. Mussolini used the
language of self victimization to justify some of the least likely aspects of his desires for Italy.
By using it to deter blame from Italy’s entrance into war with Hitler, Mussolini claimed that
Hitler dragged him into war, and that he had never wanted to actually go to war. With this blatant
use of self victimization, Mussolini allowed for Italians to continue this rhetoric and avoid any
sense of culpability for the acts Italy committed in the war. This language continued and became
one of Lega’s tactics to gain support for their party. When the party was initially founded in the
early 1990s as a secessionist one, Umberto Bossi used this language as a justification for why
Northern Italy should succeed from the South. When Matteo Salvini took over the party in 2013,
he strategically transformed the party from secessionist to nationalist in light of the influx of
immigrants coming to Europe through Italy. By uniting Italy against these immigrants through
the same rhetoric of Mussolini, Salvini was able to launch the Lega into the political arena as a
populist, nationalist party. The impact of the self victimization trope has been repeated due to the
amnesia of Fascism and the hardship it caused Italy during its 20 years in power.
In addition to self victimization espoused by both Fascism and the Lega, they also have in
common their complicated relationships with religion and the Church. Historically, Catholicism
has been an integral part of what it means to be Italian. Though Mussolini was an atheist himself
and always felt uncomfortable around members of the clergy, he began a symbiotic relationship
with the Pope in order to gain the support of the more religious Italians. This relationship was
often tumultuous as both Mussolini and the Pope were trying to determine the best course for
their relationship. Both men were eventually able to come to an agreement in which both could
strengthen their respective power within the Italian population. However, the Lega has had a
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much more contentious relationship with the Pope. Ever since Bossi came to power, he has been
against the current Pope’s more liberal, progressive approach to religion in general. This tension
between the Lega and the Pope increased even more so when Francis became the Pope. At this
time, Salvini was in charge of the Lega and had begun scapegoating the immigrants as the source
of Italy’s problems. Salvini has been able to not alienate more conservative Catholics by
focusing more on the traditional aspects of Catholicism rather than the religious ones. In this
way, he is still able to reach Italians who believe in this idea of Italy as a Catholic nation and at
the same time, denounce the Pope’s desire to let refugees into Italy. Through my research, I have
largely come to the conclusion that by Italy actively forgetting their Fascist past, Italy has
allowed the Lega to repeat this rhetoric and relationship with the Church.
These are just two major connections between Fascism and the Lega Nord which clearly
show the prevalence of historical amnesia in Italy. This particular connection between Fascism
and the Lega has yet to be made in the academic world, and I believe it is worth exploring more
in depth. Though there are obvious differences between the two parties and time periods, I think
it is worth looking at the trajectory of the Lega, and what can be done to change its course. I
initially set out to look at the influx of immigration in Italy and how and why Italy is reacting the
way that it has. However, as I began to sift through all the information I noticed many troubling
parallels between these two time periods and these two parties. Although many explanations
were presented as to why Italy was reacting the way it was, not a single one seemed to address
problems of the past. These parallels raised a very interesting and quite challenging question:
what caused this to happen again? It is my belief that this connection is worth exploring as it has
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not been accounted for when looking at Italy’s xenophobic response. My hope with this thesis is
to bridge a gap in the literature in order to try and answer this question through a different lens.
I have begun to tackle unexplored territory, and I have only been able to begin to scratch
the surface of these two major connections, but given more time and more resources, this is a
subject ripe for further analysis. My hope would be for this research to continue in order to
contribute to the wider literature of Italy’s, and in fact Europe’s, xenophobic response. I believe
that by adding this specific argument to the literature, we can come to a deeper understanding of
how and why this has been the reaction and potentially build a more just and kind sense of
nationhood. In addition, there are many more connections between the Lega and Fascism that I
simply did not have the time to explore. I hope that in the future, more extensive work will be
done on this topic to find all the similarities between the two. My main goal with this project was
to show a significant connection between these two, and I sincerely hope I have done what I set
out to do. I realize there is more research to be done, and I hope that I have inspired that.
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